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Abstract
We consider a policymaker who must choose between the status
quo and proposals made by lobbyists. Each lobbyist aims to maximize
the tariﬀ accorded his industry, but realizes that if he proposes too
high a tariﬀ, the policymaker may choose the proposal oﬀered by
another lobbyist which incorporates a lower tariﬀ. The equilibrium
has a positive probability that the policymaker who aims to maximize
social welfare adopts a tariﬀ higher than the one he prefers.
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11 Introduction
A large literature examines the inﬂuence of lobbies (or of special-interest
groups) on policy. One important approach considers implicit or explicit
bribery: the special interest oﬀers money in return for the policy it favors.
The seminal work in this approach is Grossman and Helpman (1994), who
show that organized special interest groups get tariﬀ protection or export
subsidies, whereas diﬀused interests do not. A second important approach
(Baron (1989)) considers the access enjoyed by a lobby, with inﬂuence arising
from the private information the lobby provides the policymaker.
This paper examines a third mechanism: lobbies propose the policies
among which the policymaker must choose. We thus depart from the common
assumption that a policymaker can adopt any policy he wishes. We instead
suppose that drafting policy is costly and diﬃcult. This is especially likely
in state legislatures, where legislators control few resources, relying on the
executive branch or even on lobbyists to draft the legislation on which they
vote.1 At times of crisis, which demand quick action, a policymaker may rely
even more heavily on policies previously developed by others. The inﬂuence
of special interests on drafting policy has also generated political heat. For
example, in 2004 the United States Supreme Court heard a suit demanding
that Vice President Cheney disclose the names of the individuals he had
consulted when drafting energy policy. In May 2004, the Environmental
Protection Agency approved an air pollution regulation that could save the
wood products industry hundreds of millions of dollars, relying on a risk
assessment generated by a chemical industry-funded think tank, and a novel
legal approach recommended by a timber industry lawyer.2 Neely (1982, p.
80), a former West Virginia legislator, writes that because of tremendous
demands on legislators’ time and resources,
It is not possible to initiate programs; the most we can expect
for legislators is to react to programs ... [P]aid lobbyists on all
sides bang out the compromises and reﬁne legislation long before
1For instance, the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (ASPCA)
cites the achievements of Ledy VanKavage, Director of the ASPCA’s Midwest Government
Aﬀairs and Public Policy, who got the Companion Animal Hoarder Bill signed into law in
Illinois in August 2001. See http://www.animaland.org/asp/career/index.asp.
2Alan C. Miller and Tom Hamburger “EPA Relied on Industry for Plywood Plant
Pollution Rule,” Los Angeles Times, May 21, 2004, electronic edition.
2a legislator is required to take a position on it. The development
of comprehensive, politically acceptable legislative packages re-
quires scores of man-years of work, and no single legislator or
even group of legislators has resources like that at their disposal.
It is the business of paid lobbyists to bring to legislators proposed
packages of legislation from which to work ...
Similarly, in their exhaustive study of tariﬀ legislation in the 1950s, Bauer,
Pool, and Dexter (1963) ﬁnd that lobbyists largely served as “adjuncts to
staﬀ,” as “service bureaus” to legislators.
To say that special interests draft policies among which the policymaker
chooses does not make the special interests all powerful. For competition
among special interests can lead them to draft proposals which will appeal
to the policymaker, as we show below.
We can interpret our analysis in a diﬀerent way: rather than a lobby
proposing policies, it provides useful information to a policymaker, but de-
mands favors in return. For example, a labor union representing steel workers
may inform a congressman about the preferences of its workers on health care
or abortion, but will provide such information only if the congressman sup-
ports a tariﬀ on steel. We thus turn around the view that lobbies seek access
to congressmen, with the idea that congressmen seek access to lobbyists.3
2 Literature
2.1 Agenda setting
We build on earlier papers which study agenda setting. Agenda setting within
legislatures is modeled by Baron and Ferejohn (1989), Baron (1989), and
Harrington (1990). They assume that any legislator can make a proposal,
3Several papers examine the informational beneﬁts to a politician who grants access.
The information can concern the importance of the problem a legislator is consider-
ing (Hansen (1991), Smith (1995)), the eﬀectiveness of policy (Krehbiel (1991), Smith
(1995)), and the electoral consequences of diﬀerent policies (Kingdon (1984), Hansen
(1991), Austen-Smith (1993), Rasmussen (1993), and Lohmann (1995)). Esteban and
Ray (2004) extend these models by considering a government aiming to maximize eﬃ-
ciency but uncertain about the best policy; the confounding eﬀects of vociferous lobbying
by both the most productive and the richest groups leave government unsure about which
groups to favor, and so may lead it to enact ineﬃcient policies.
3but that proposals are considered in a random order. In proposing and voting
on policies a legislator must thus compare the beneﬁts from the proposal to
the status quo, and to a future proposal. They also assume, as we do,
that legislation, once adopted by majority vote, cannot be amended—the
legislative session ends.
Our examination also relates to the analysis by Gilligan and Krehbiel
(1987), who show how legislators can beneﬁt from the closed rule rather
than the open rule for proposals made by a committee. The inability of the
ﬂoor to amend proposals made by a committee gives committee members the
incentive to expend the eﬀort to become informed, yielding better policies.
We follow them in supposing that the legislators who vote on a policy cannot
amend a policy proposed to them.
Several authors consider the incentives for introducing legislation. King-
don (1984) presents interview data on who proposes policies. In a study
of the Cuban missile crisis, Allison (1971) shows that the ability to make
proposals can give the proposer much inﬂuence. Banks and Gasmi (1986)
inquire into the policies members of a committee or legislature will propose.
Competition among lobbyists in proposing policies is studied by Epstein
and Nitzan (2004) and by Munster (2005). They show conditions under
which a lobby will propose moderate policies with the aim of reducing the
other lobby’s eﬀorts.
2.2 Costs to legislator of drafting policy
Empirical research suggests that a legislator may face a high opportunity
cost in drafting or proposing policy, and that the incentives for spending
time on policy may be especially weak when drafting legislation is a pub-
lic good for legislators who favor the policy. In particular, an important
opportunity cost of a legislator’s time consists of foregone opportunities for
constituency service. Surveys ﬁnd that a fourth of the American public con-
siders constituency service to be a congressman’s most important activity
(Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina (1987), p. 39). One congressional aide (cited
in Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina (1987), p. 79) expressed the representative’s
duties as follows:
You’re elected to be a legislator, but casework and projects keep
you elected. People in the district expect you to represent them
4in their dealings with the bureaucracy. Our prime responsibility
is to see them and attend to their problems.
Johannes (1984) also oﬀers evidence that voters demand constituency ser-
vice and district-oriented eﬀort. He cites (p. 188), for instance, a CBS-New
York Times poll ﬁnding that more people believe it important for a congress-
man to help constituents deal with the bureaucracy than to work in Congress
on bills of national interest. Fiorina (1977, 1981) ﬁnds that a voter is more
likely to vote for an incumbent congressman the more satisﬁed he is with the
congressman’s service to individual constituents, such as interventions with
the Social Security Administration to deliver a delayed check. Yiannakis
(1981) also ﬁnds that persons who received good casework are more inclined
to vote for the incumbent.
These costs of drafting policy can aﬀect the policies a legislator proposes,
by inducing him to propose policies which are supported by a large majority
of legislators (Glazer and McMillan (1992)), or by proposing policies which




Consider a policymaker who can choose among policy packages presented
to him; he cannot amend any package. A policy package is described by
three variables. The ﬁrst variable refers to a policy which directly aﬀects
no special interest, but which concerns a legislator; we call this policy a
“public issue.” For simplicity, this policy (π) is binary: either the status
quo is maintained, or else the policy proposed has a ﬁxed value, which the
policymaker prefers to the status quo. We indicate the (bad) status quo
by B, and the (good) alternative by G. Examples of good alternatives are a
modiﬁcation of patent law to induce innovation in the biotechnology industry,
funding of the Department of Agriculture to combat mad cow disease, or the
organization of auctions for governmental allocations of the radio spectrum.
The remaining two elements of a package are the tariﬀs, t1 and t2 on goods
1 and 2. Thus, policy is indicated by the vector (π,t1,t2). The status quo,





The policymaker’s utility is U(π,t1,t2), with U(G,t1,t2) > U(B,t1,t2): he
prefers G over B. We can make general assumptions about how utility varies
with t1 and t2; what is essential to our results is that the industry prefers
a tariﬀ higher than what the policymaker wants. To highlight the eﬀects,
and to simplify the analysis, we assume that the policymaker’s utility de-
clines with the tariﬀ: ∂U/∂t1 < 0 and ∂U/∂t2 < 0. Also for simplicity, we
suppose that the status quo is (B,0,0). Lastly, tariﬀs enter symmetrically
into the policymaker’s utility function: U(π,x,y) = U(π,y,x). Though this
assumption is not essential for any of the qualitative results, it simpliﬁes the
analysis.
Deﬁne tm
1 as the value of t1 satisfying U(G,tm
1 ,0) = U(B,0,0); deﬁne tm
2
analogously. Thus, tm
1 is the maximum tariﬀ on good 1 which the policymaker
would accept in return for having G instead of B.
The policymaker, say the decisive legislator, cannot propose a policy, but
can only choose between policy packages presented to him, or else reject
all proposals, thereby maintaining the status quo. The essential results,
however, would also hold if the legislator could propose a policy, but because
he is less informed than the lobby, or can devote less eﬀort to drafting a
policy, the policy he proposes is inferior to the one a lobbyist may propose.
Thus, suppose that at a cost c the legislator can draft a policy (g,0,0),
with g < G. Then the legislator will prefer a policy the lobby proposes if
U(G,tm
1 ,0) > U(g,0,0) − c.
3.3 Lobbies
We consider two special-interest groups, or lobbies. Lobby i represents in-
dustry i, which favors a tariﬀ on good i. Each lobby can propose one policy
package, (π,t1,t2). Proposing a policy package costs a lobby c. The lobbies
choose the policies simultaneously. The utility of lobby i from tariﬀ ti is
simply ti. For convenience we shall speak of the lobby as simultaneously
oﬀering a policy proposal and a tariﬀ, and of the policymaker as simultane-
ously choosing policy and a tariﬀ. But we would have the same results if
instead lobbies and policymakers had implicit contracts—a policymaker who
is indebted to a lobby for drafting policy later grants the favored industry a
tariﬀ.
64 Equilibrium
Each lobby ﬁrst decides what package, if any, to propose. The policymaker
then maximizes his utility, choosing either the status quo, the package pro-
posed by lobby 1 (if any), or the package proposed by lobby 2 (if any). We
consider symmetric Nash equilibria among symmetric lobbyists.
4.1 Characteristics of equilibrium
Our assumptions immediately yield several implications about the proposals
a lobby would make. First, any proposal by a lobby will specify π = G, and
no tariﬀ on the other good. The lobby thereby maximizes the policymaker’s
utility for any given tariﬀ on its own good, and so makes its proposal more
attractive to the policymaker.
Second, in any Nash equilibrium a lobby proposes a policy with positive
probability. For if, say, lobby 1 proposed nothing, lobby 2 could propose
(G,0,tm
2 ), which the policymaker would adopt. If tm
2 > c, this would increase
the lobby’s utility over the status quo.
Third, in the Nash equilibrium each lobby uses mixed strategies in oﬀering
a proposal and in setting its content. To see why no equilibrium can have
pure strategies, suppose lobby i always proposed a known tariﬀ ti. If the two
tariﬀ proposals diﬀered, then the lobby proposing a lower tariﬀ would always
win, and the other lobby would always incur a loss of c. And if t1 = t2, so
that each gets its proposal adopted with non-inﬁnitesimal probability, then
any one lobby would undercut the other lobby’s proposal by an inﬁnitesimal
amount, ensure that its package is adopted, and so increase its utility.
To determine the equilibrium, we consider a strategy of the following
form. A lobby proposes a positive tariﬀ with probability m. If it does pro-
pose a positive tariﬀ, then the probability density function for its proposal
is positive for all values of t lying in some interval (tL,tH); we call the corre-
sponding probability distribution function F(t).
If m > 0, then a lobby’s must enjoy the same expected utility when it
proposes a package as when it does not, namely zero. That is, for any tariﬀ
t that a lobby proposes in (tL,tH),
−c + t(1 − m) + tm(1 − F(t)) = 0, (1)
so that
F(t) = (t − c)/(mt). (2)
7A lobby which proposes tL has its proposal adopted for sure, but its expected
utility must be zero. Therefore
tL = c. (3)
To ﬁnd the highest tariﬀ a lobby might propose, tH, note that this proposed
tariﬀ will be adopted only if the other lobby proposed nothing, and if the
policymaker will support it over the status quo. In equilibrium, therefore,
tH = t
m. (4)
The remaining unknown is the value of m, or the probability that a lobby
proposes a positive tariﬀ. We determine its value from the condition that









In short, we have
Proposition 1 In equilibrium, each lobby drafts a bill with probability
(tm − c)/tm, where tm satisﬁes U(G,tm,0) = U(B,0,0). The policy it pro-
poses on the public issue is G. The tariﬀ, t, is drawn from the probability
distribution function F(t) = (t−c)/(mt). The legislator adopts the proposal
with the lowest tariﬀ. If no lobby proposes a policy, the status quo remains
in eﬀect.
4.2 Implications
The equilibrium has several plausible features. Sometimes government im-
poses a tariﬀ, though it realizes the ineﬃciency, and though it does not intend
to beneﬁt the industry at the expense of the public. This result contrasts
with a result by Grossman and Helpman (1994) who show that a policy-
maker provides protection because he values the contributions he gets from
the lobby. In contrast, our model has an industry getting protection while
spending little or nothing on campaign contributions, and without promising
payments if its favored policy is adopted. Moreover, empirical tests of the
Grossman–Helpman (1994) model ﬁnd that the policymaker little values con-
tributions. For instance, Goldberg and Maggi (1999) show that in the U.S.
8the policymaker’s utility function places seventy times as much weight on so-
cial welfare as on contributions.4 In our model, the policymaker maximizes
welfare and does not value contributions per se, but nevertheless protects
organized industries. Organized industries (that is industries with the abil-
ity and connections to propose policies) get protection, whereas unorganized
industries do not. But some organized industries get no protection.
4.3 Multiple issues
We considered a lobby which cares only about one issue, tariﬀ protection for
itself. The model can be extended. For instance, the steel lobby may ask
for a tariﬀ, and in addition for less stringent environment regulations and
laxer labor laws. We indicate these additional policy proposals by p. So
suppose now that the policy package proposed by lobby i is (π,ti,pi). If the
policymaker adopts this proposal, his utility is U(π,ti,pi). For suﬃciently low
values of ti and pi he prefers this package over the status quo: U(G,ti,pi) >
U(B,0,0) .The utility of lobby i is ti +pi. The reasoning from above implies
that no equilibrium in pure strategies exists, but that an equilibrium in
mixed strategies exists. It is straightforward to verify that, with a minor
modiﬁcation, the results that applied with one public policy apply to multiple
public policies.5
4.4 Multiple tariﬀs
One conclusion of the model may appear implausible: government grants
tariﬀ protection only to the industry which proposed the lowest tariﬀ, rather
than granting protection to multiple industries. But that conclusion held
only because we supposed both lobbies could propose changes on the public
issue.
Suppose instead that in addition to the tariﬀs, policy can be set on N >
1 public issues. We can make diﬀerent assumptions about the ability of
diﬀerent lobbies to propose changes on diﬀerent public issues.
4Mitra et al. (2002) reach similar conclusions in their study of Turkey.
5A lobby now propose a package with probability m. If it does propose a package, then
the probability density function for its proposal is positive for all values of t + p lying on
some interval (pL,pH); we call the corresponding probability distribution function F(p),
which corresponds to the probability density F(t) in (2) above.
9One assumption is that each lobby can propose a package that deals with
all public issues. The equilibrium would then resemble the one described
above: with positive probability less than one each lobby proposes policy G
on each public issue, it proposes tariﬀ protection for itself (with the level
following a non-degenerate probability density function), and no tariﬀ for
other industries. The policymaker then adopts that package, if any, which
oﬀers G on the public issues and the lowest tariﬀ. Here again, only one
industry will enjoy a tariﬀ.
The results diﬀer if a lobby is constrained in the policies it can propose on
public issues. This can arise if the lobbies diﬀer in expertise or credibility on
diﬀerent public issues, or if a lobby faces increasing marginal cost of proposing
policies. For simplicity, suppose each lobby can propose G on only one public
issue, and that each lobby believes that with probability 1/N the other lobby
will propose a policy on the same public issue. The policymaker, however,
would prefer to change the status quo on several public issues. Since he can
only implement packages proposed by a lobby, to address multiple issues he
may have to adopt multiple tariﬀs proposed by diﬀerent lobbies.
More explicitly, let policy on public issue j be πj, for j = 1,2,...N. The
status quo is B for each of the N public issues. Let πij indicate that lobby i
proposes policy G on public issue j. The policy package proposed by lobby i
is now given by (πij,t1,t2). The policymaker’s utility is U(π1...πN,t1,t2). We
assume, as in the model above, that the policymaker’s utility declines with
any tariﬀ. We assume further that the policymaker’s disutility from a tariﬀ
on good i increases with the tariﬀ on good j, or that ∂2U/∂ti∂tj0. Lastly,
the utility of lobby i from the adoption of a tariﬀ on good i is ti.
It is straightforward to verify, as in our discussion of the simpler model,
several characteristics of the equilibrium. First, a proposal by a lobby will
specify π = G on the public issue it can address, a positive tariﬀ on its own
good, and a zero tariﬀ on the other good.
Second, in a Nash equilibrium each lobby proposes proposes a policy with
positive probability. For if one lobby, say lobby 1, proposed nothing, lobby
2 could propose (Gi,0,tm
2 ), which the government would adopt.
Third, the Nash equilibrium has each lobby use mixed strategies in of-
fering a proposal and in setting the content of the proposal. For with some
positive probability, both lobbies will propose policy G on the same public
issue, and the policymaker would then adopt the package proposed by the
lobby that proposes a lower tariﬀ. Were strategies pure, then any one lobby
would beneﬁt by proposing a tariﬀ inﬁnitesimally lower than that proposed
10by the other lobby.
The equilibrium strategies will have the form described before. A lobby
proposes a positive tariﬀ with probability m. If it does propose a positive
tariﬀ, then the probability density function for its proposal is positive for all
values of t lying on some interval (tL,tH); we call the corresponding proba-
bility distribution function F(t).
If m > 0, then a lobby which makes no proposal has zero utility, and so
the expected utility of a lobby which makes a proposal is also zero. That is,
for any tariﬀ t that a lobby proposes in (tL,tH),
−c + t(1 − m) + tm(1 − F(t))[1/N + (1 − 1/N)] = 0. (7)
The ﬁrst term in the square brackets above, 1/N, is the probability that both
lobbies propose a policy on a given public issue. The second term, (1−1/N),
is the probability that the two lobbies propose policies on diﬀerent public





Note that (8) is identical to (2). It is straightforward to verify that the
solutions for tL, tH, and consequently, m will be the same as the solutions we
obtained when a lobby could address only one public issue. The implication
of the results, however, diﬀers. Both lobbies propose a positive tariﬀ with
probability m, but propose G on diﬀerent issues with probability (1−1/N).
In equilibrium, with positive probability an industry is granted protection,
and with positive probability the status quo on multiple issues is changed.
5 Conclusion
We considered inﬂuence activity arising from the interaction between compet-
ing lobbies (which propose policy packages) and a policymaker. Our results
show that a policymaker may protect industries even if he realizes the inef-
ﬁciency and even if he places no value on campaign contributions or money.
When the two lobbies compete for protection, each proposing policy on the
same public issue, with some probability the lobby proposing the lowest tar-
iﬀ will get protection and some organized industries will get no protection.
When lobbies can propose policies on diﬀerent public issues, the equilibrium
will have multiple tariﬀs.
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